Are there norms that can always guide us? Epistemologists convinced by Tim Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument argue that there are no such norms. The project of seeking perfectly guiding norms and theories fails because of issues of epistemic access. My aims in this talk are twofold. First, I probe the connection between guidance and epistemic access. Second, I discuss worries about guidance that are distinct from the standard access worries. Access worries are often raised in connection with a deliberative view of guidance. If access was the only issue, then we might hope for norms that can at least often be used in deliberation to answer questions about what to do. I argue that the deliberative model of guidance is problematic irrespective of luminosity issues. The deliberative model is highly intellectualised in ways that prevent even normal adults from satisfying it with respect to a very wide range of norms. But neither, I will argue, are deliberatively guided agents normatively ideal. First, the epistemic idealizations invoked are arbitrary. Second, seeking deliberative guidance is at least often a pathology, not an ideal.